An aerial view of the Syria–Lebanon border at the Masnaa crossing, a strategic gateway at the center of growing regional security concerns. For the past year and a half, President Donald Trump has repeatedly placed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in an awkward position by publicly claiming that he was the one who put him in office. The embarrassment has deepened in recent weeks following reports that Trump has urged Damascus to intervene militarily in Lebanon, effectively aligning itself with Israel against Hezbollah.
There is little doubt that Syria’s inclusion in the international coalition has created a profound dilemma for President al-Sharaa in the eyes of many of his former comrades. Not long ago, they fought together and were all designated as terrorists. Today, however, al-Sharaa’s government is part of the international coalition against terrorism, while many of his former allies are being targeted and killed by coalition forcesو and, increasingly, by Syrian government forces themselvesو as part of the global campaign against terrorism.
This transformation has undoubtedly cost him a significant portion of his original support base. Now, as calls intensify for Damascus to join the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, al-Sharaa risks alienating what remains of that constituency—not only among his former jihadist associates, but also among ordinary Syrians, the overwhelming majority of whom firmly reject any Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, whether against Hezbollah or any other Lebanese faction.
History offers a sobering precedent. At international request, Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon in June 1976 and remained there until April 2005, when its forces withdrew within less than twenty-four hours under intense American pressure following the international conclusion that Bashar al-Assad had orchestrated the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Looking back, Syria’s entry into Lebanon nearly fifty years ago stands as one of the most consequential strategic mistakes in the country’s modern history. It left behind devastation, resentment, and deep wounds on both sides of the border. Crimes committed during that period continue to cast a long shadow over Syrian Lebanese relations and will likely remain part of the collective memory of both nations for generations.
Trump, meanwhile, appears determined to find a regional government, military, or armed faction willing to support his broader strategy against Iran after failing to persuade European allies, Arab partners, or even his close ally Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to participate.
From Washington’s perspective, Ahmad al-Sharaa may represent an attractive opportunity. He leads a transitional government that depends heavily on international political backing and seeks external support to prolong its survival. Like many governments in the region, its long-term viability depends largely on remaining aligned with, and acceptable to, the prevailing international order.
This is precisely where Syria faces its greatest dilemma.
Can Damascus politely decline Trump’s request while limiting cooperation to counterterrorism, an objective that serves both Syrian and international interests, produces mutual benefits, and carries relatively manageable costs?
Or is Trump determined to press ahead until he sees Syrian forces crossing the Lebanese border?
“Syria’s greatest challenge is not choosing sides but avoiding a war it cannot afford.”
Abdulrahman Rabboa
President al-Sharaa has already addressed much of this speculation. In an interview with Tony Khalife on Al Mashhad TV, he stated unequivocally that Damascus neither intends nor wishes to become involved in regional wars or proxy conflicts, particularly in Lebanon. Instead, he emphasized that Syria’s new leadership prefers to focus on addressing the country’s pressing social, economic, and humanitarian crises rather than becoming entangled in an external conflict whose costs Syria cannot afford.
Al-Sharaa further explained that his government is concentrating on securing Syria’s borders, preventing the smuggling of weapons and narcotics, and ensuring that Syrian territory is not used as a launching pad for armed groups, rather than engaging in direct military intervention in Lebanon.
His position also reflects an awareness of Lebanon’s historical sensitivities. Large segments of Lebanese society continue to view Syria’s former military presence with deep suspicion, while senior Lebanese officials—from the presidency, government, and parliament, have consistently rejected any Syrian military or security role inside Lebanon under any justification, emphasizing the importance of preserving Lebanese sovereignty.
Iran, for its part, has delivered an equally explicit warning. Tehran has indicated that it would not remain passive should Syrian forces participate in military operations against Hezbollah. According to these warnings, Damascus itself could become a target for Iranian, Iraqi, and Yemeni missiles and drones, potentially triggering a broader regional conflict.
Such a scenario could also provoke widespread domestic unrest inside Syria. A substantial segment of Syrian society might turn against the transitional government, reviving instability, armed confrontations, and political turmoil. The al-Sharaa government is fully aware of these risks, or at the very least, it should be.
Türkiye has likewise refrained from remaining silent. According to Turkish media reports, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has rejected any attempt to pressure Damascus into participating militarily in Lebanon against Hezbollah.
The prevailing sentiment in Ankara today is that, after Iran, Türkiye itself could become Israel’s next strategic target. Consequently, Ankara has shown little willingness to support American efforts directed against Tehran or its regional allies, and it has no interest in seeing Syria drawn into the Lebanese conflict, regardless of the incentives that may be offered.
It is also self-evident that any existential threat to Hezbollah would inflame public opinion among Lebanon’s Shiite community, and potentially among Shiite populations across the wider region. Such developments could generate unprecedented local, regional, and international sympathy for Hezbollah while fueling sectarian tensions throughout the Middle East.
In that event, Syria’s transitional government would likely reap only bitter consequences. Its involvement could ultimately undermine its own survival, particularly if hundreds, or even thousands, of Syrian soldiers were to return home from Lebanon in coffins, while Iranian ballistic missiles and drones struck Damascus without meaningful deterrence or response.
The central question, therefore, is whether Syria’s transitional leadership is fully weighing these risks should it find itself confronted with an unavoidable test, whether through direct American pressure demanding Syrian military intervention, or through unforeseen circumstances that leave Damascus believing it has no choice but to enter Lebanon regardless of the consequences.
History teaches that events rarely unfold according to logic or wisdom. More often than not, history is written in blood. Its pages are dominated by tyrants and military commanders, while its statistics record little beyond the numbers of the dead and the captured.
“History is often written in blood; wisdom lies in refusing to repeat it.”
Abdulrahman Rabboa
Will Syria’s transitional government lead the country into history through that familiar and tragic gateway?
Or will it instead choose the politically riskier path of declining Trump’s demands, even if doing so means risking the loss of Washington’s support?
