Syria’s Next Test: Accountability and Good Governance 

The question of democracy occupies a broad and contentious space in Syrian public life. This debate has intensified significantly since the fall of the Assad regime, through the convening of the People’s Assembly, and in the deep disagreements that have emerged over democracy as a concept and over how it is reflected in the policies of the transitional authorities on the ground.

These differences have largely crystallized around two principal trends. The first calls for setting aside the language and mechanisms of democracy, arguing that democracy is a Western cultural product that does not correspond to the realities of the “new Syria.” This view reinforces the discourse of the new authorities and provides an important rationale for prolonging exceptional conditions in Syria, even as the country approaches two years since the decisive change of December 2024.

The second trend maintains that there is no viable alternative to democracy as a path toward rebuilding the state. Experiences of good governance in countries emerging from wars, crises, and internal conflicts indicate that no political approach can offer a durable way forward without democratic practice. The lessons of human experience are no longer the preserve of any particular regime or political system. Democracy and its various concepts are part of the broader intellectual heritage of humanity and can no longer be confined to specific political experiences of the twentieth century.

Authority and Governance

As new systems of government emerge today and seek the conditions necessary for sustainable development and stability, justice, equality, and participation in decision-making have become central components of national policy. They are reflected in local administration, elections, active political life, political parties, and civil society organizations.

This is the model adopted by governing systems in many parts of the world, including Muslim-majority countries. In essence, it is democracy—the very concept that a large and influential segment of Syrians remains reluctant to embrace, believing that it threatens the structure of the new authority and weakens its ability to confront current challenges. They also argue that the country is not yet ready for democratic transition, while simultaneously regarding the election and convening of the People’s Assembly as an important and exceptional achievement. In reality, that achievement is itself one of the manifestations of the very democracy they reject.

In fact, the arguments advanced by supporters of the authorities do not necessarily strengthen them. Rather, they may create obstacles to the natural and gradual transition of the temporary authority into a national governing authority in the constitutional sense.

There is, so far, no evidence that democratic policies in Syria would threaten or weaken the transitional authorities. On the contrary, open public debate can reveal both the strengths and the shortcomings of any strategy adopted or contemplated by the authorities, as well as the demands expressed by different sectors of society.

“Public debate does not weaken authority; it exposes strengths, identifies failures, and strengthens governance.”

Abdulrahman Matar

The absence of public debate, and the deliberate disregard for its importance, creates space for one-sided and unproductive discourse amid broader disorder.

Strengthening “authority” as a position and a role, in its current form, effectively means continuing exceptional and temporary policies and further concentrating decision-making in the hands of those in power. In practice, this can lead to the monopolization of state administration through political influence and force.

This is precisely what current policies appear to suggest, particularly amid the debates surrounding the method of electing the People’s Assembly, the conduct of its proceedings, and the scope of its powers.

The central question therefore becomes unavoidable: does Syria’s new leadership intend to remain a transitional or temporary authority with broad and undefined powers and influence, or does it seek to move toward genuine governance of the Syrian state?

Good Governance

The claim that Syrian society is not ready for democratic transition does not appear objective. On the contrary, it rests on a deeply flawed understanding of Syrian society, particularly with regard to education, culture, and the capacity of Syrians to confront social and political challenges.

Such a judgment is unfair to Syrians and obscures their ability to participate meaningfully in rebuilding the new Syria.

What policies are the authorities adopting today to empower Syrian society and prepare it to take part in democratic transformation? And why must Syrians always be told that they have to begin from zero?

In my view, Syrians are well equipped by the harsh experiences they have endured during half a century of Assad-era authoritarianism, including the bitter years since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011. These experiences have given them the capacity to participate genuinely and effectively in building, developing, and advancing the state.

Yet despite the popular support the authorities currently enjoy—support that constitutes one source of their legitimacy—they have not given this dimension the minimum attention it deserves. This suggests a tendency to impose policies in the management of the state and society rather than share responsibility for that process.

In other words, the authorities do not appear willing to allow others to become meaningful partners in governance.

They do not appear ready to move into a new phase of the transitional period in accordance with the lessons of other societies: namely, to become a responsible and prudent authority capable of achieving a civil transition under difficult conditions and ultimately moving toward good governance—governance that places the country firmly on a path of development, reconstruction, and progress.

This, in my view, is the aspiration of Syrians across the political spectrum, including even those who oppose democratic transformation.

We can therefore demand from the authorities not only prudent governance, but also sound and responsible administration of the country. This means assuming full responsibility across all dimensions of national reconstruction.

Such a process cannot take place in isolation from several fundamental principles associated with good governance and emphasized by the United Nations: transparency, accountability, participation, and responsiveness to the needs of the people.

Drawing on these principles does not mean importing alien ideas or adopting policies and concepts incompatible with our societies. Rather, they are urgently needed instruments for helping Syrians move beyond the current crisis. Through these indicators, we can examine the Syrian reality and develop alternatives and policies capable of producing real solutions to the country’s national challenges.

The ambiguity that continues to characterize the new authorities cannot persist indefinitely. Clarity and transparency regarding the policies they pursue, and the priorities they set, are critically important.

“Ambiguity breeds suspicion; transparency builds public trust.”

Abdulrahman Matar

Syrians have the right to know: What are the authorities’ priorities? What policies are being developed to address the succession of crises? What is their broader vision? And how are they planning for the future?

Ambiguity creates fertile ground for speculation and suspicion. It erodes public trust and makes apprehension the natural first response to government plans and projects.

The issues of ambiguity and transparency are also directly connected to broad public participation in decision-making, both at the national level and within local communities. Such participation is essential for understanding citizens’ needs and responding to their demands.

There are important examples. These include the process of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, in northeastern Syria without simultaneously opening the file of justice; demands for information about the fate of the missing; concerns over detainees transferred to Iraq; and protests in Raqqa and Ain Minin.

The new authorities can strengthen the structures and capacities of local administration in Syria. This may prove to be one of the most effective policies for promoting public participation, addressing the needs of local communities, and resolving local problems.

One possible approach would be to hold local administration elections, similar in principle to the process used for the People’s Assembly elections, notwithstanding the reservations surrounding that experience.

Yet perhaps the most important indicator of responsible and sound governance is the existence of institutional mechanisms—that is, laws—that subject decision-makers at every level of authority to accountability, questioning, oversight, and public scrutiny within the legal framework currently in force, including the constitutional declaration itself.

There is no ready-made or magical formula for good governance. But the pursuit of it through the enforcement of law is what can ensure the country’s survival and development.

“Syria’s next test is moving from de facto authority to governance grounded in justice and accountability.”

Abdulrahman Matar

It is also what can move Syria from the legitimacy of liberation and de facto authority toward national governance based on justice and equality.

That transition is entirely possible in the new Syria.

And it will be the next major test.