Syrians celebrate their liberation in Damascus in December 2024An examination of the political and security dynamics in Syria reveals that Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, has not successfully navigated the transitional phase after the Assad regime’s downfall. Even with some political and diplomatic backing from key global players involved in Syria, al-Julani’s failure to move beyond a militant mindset has led to a significant structural crisis in his approach to this transition. His numerous attempts to redefine his role both on a national and international level have largely been unsuccessful, stemming from a critical issue: a lack of earnest commitment to act as a legitimate political actor that could foster stability in political, social, and security realms. Current developments indicate a trend towards establishing a new authoritarian regime, similar to the security framework Jabhat al-Nusra established in Idlib beginning in 2016. Concurrently, a quasi-state financial system has emerged, rooted in a patronage economy based on personal loyalty rather than formal legitimacy. This article looks into the fundamental reasons for al-Julani’s failure to navigate the transitional phase by exploring the structural challenges hindering a true shift from an armed group to a credible political entity.
Attempting Ideological Rebranding:
At the onset of the transition, al-Julani sought to reshape his ideology, aiming to distance himself from his past as the leader of a terrorist organization tied to al- Qaeda, which was responsible for numerous acts of terror and severe human rights abuses. His primary goal was to move away from this history without genuinely confronting it, indicating a lack of true ideological review. Instead, he engaged in superficial self-redefinition, focusing on contemporary realities while neglecting the serious crimes of his past. This matter can be inferred by assessing al-Julani’s approach towards several essential files like transitional justice. He intentionally delayed addressing transitional justice and hindered any legal actions in this regard.
“Practically, it is further evidence indicating the intention to conceal Jabhat al-Nusra’s role in the significant violations that occurred during the conflict.”
Dr. Yahya Alaridi
The transitional authority’s administrative structure died with its birth:
In the early days following the regime’s collapse, an “interim government” was declared, directly controlled by al-Julani and made up of loyalists. Shortly after, he held a meeting with military factions loyal to him, subsequently positioning himself as the leader of the transitional phase—a clear indication of his intent to monopolize power. There was no establishment of a transitional governing council that included various political forces, social representatives, or opposition groups. The media discourse at the time purposefully excluded established opposition entities, such as the Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Negotiation Commission, which were later dissolved. This indicates a strategic move to eliminate any political opposition to his authority. Current observations of the administrative, political, and military appointments in the Syrian institutions confirm this reality. A political and administrative structure has been reconstituted that resembles the previous Assad regime, lacking any standards or representation for the diverse Syrian populace that al-Julani has sidelined. In this context, it becomes clear that al-Julani prioritizes consolidating political power over the wellbeing of the state itself.
Pragmatism vs. Jihadist Ideology:
Barbara Leaf’s description of al-Julani may have been misguided. Pragmatism, which emphasizes practical results, fundamentally contradicts jihadist ideology, which is tied to strict religious tenets that resist transformation. This essential misalignment highlights a significant flaw in politically managing such a delicate situation— permitting jihadist ideology to gain state-like authority. Despite al-Julani’s promises to dismantle Jabhat al-Nusra, combat ISIS, and remove foreign jihadists from the political and military landscape, he has not acted on these commitments. This stems from a lack of genuine intent to abandon the jihadist framework and his failure to address the concerns surrounding jihadist elements. The alarming rise of extremist ideology in Syria and the incorporation of former extremist fighters into the military and security structures are evident. Al-Julani managed to persuade international leaders that sidelining his fellow jihadists would lead to further disorder in Syria, which resulted in the U.S. allowing him to integrate 3,500 foreign fighters into the new Syrian army. Nonetheless, this action primarily strengthened his hold on power, using these jihadists as potential leverage when needed.
Failure to understand and participate the Regional Political Game
Syria has become a fractured nation after 14 years of civil conflict involving various international and regional players with clashing interests. This fragmentation has created a complex landscape that demands substantial effort to understand and address longstanding issues. In a geopolitically delicate area like Syria, it is challenging for any political figure to maintain relevance without effectively managing the interests of regional powers, such as Israel and Turkey, as well as major international states like Iran, Russia, the United States, and the Gulf countries. In this context, al-Jolani has sought to accommodate the interests of Turkey and the Gulf nations while attempting to forge closer relations with the United States, aiming to balance against Israel’s strategic concerns—given its pivotal role in the region. However, al-Jolani’s fundamental error lies in his assumption that gaining power in Syria relies solely on external backing and catering to foreign interests, neglecting the need for genuine internal political reform. This approach mirrors the mistakes of his predecessor, Bashar al-Assad, demonstrating that al-Jolani is more focused on consolidating his political authority than on fostering true state-building efforts, and he has not actually moved to the concept and logic of the state.
Returning to Terrorism in a Suit and Tie
Recent developments in Syria highlight a continued failure to move away from jihadist ideology and toward a state-oriented framework. Al-Jolani has essentially replicated his previous approach as a leader of a terrorist group, but now donning a suit and tie. The incidents in Syria’s coastal region in March 2025, along with events in Jaramana, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in May 2025, and Sweida in July 2025, illustrate how al-Jolani resorted to severe repression to control communities resisting the formation of a new authoritarian regime. Such actions resulted in significant human rights abuses and serious crimes, possibly amounting to crimes against humanity. This pattern indicates that al-Jolani is not genuinely committed to building a state with functioning institutions; rather, his priority is consolidating his political power through a rigid, centralized regime that overlooks the legitimate demands of Syria’s diverse society.
“However, Israeli intervention that constituted regional limitations thwarted his efforts to impose authority in northeastern and southern Syria, leading him to pursue international negotiations to navigate a political crisis largely of his own making due to the violations that underscored his unwillingness to share power with the Syrian populace.”
Dr. Yahya Alaridi
Whoever relies on deepening sectarian divisions in society will be unable to establish a state:
Rather than striving for unity among all Syrian components, al-Jolani has actively deepened divisions, in order to get support from the Sunni community, which has suffered significantly throughout 14 years of conflict. In this context, he did not aim to address Sunni grievances as a basis for establishing a sovereign state but rather leveraged them to bolster his internal legitimacy. He also used the narrative of “the potential return to Sednaya prison” as a threat against the Sunni community in case he fails to dominate minority communities that may dominate the political power again in Syria. It was a strategy that won him popular Sunni backing. This narrative was utilized to garner military and political support for his regime while rationalizing the systematic abuses committed by his forces. Following the events in Sweida, al- Jolani explicitly expressed gratitude to “Bedouin tribes” that participated in sectarian violence in the city. This further emphasizes that al-Jolani is intentionally entrenching sectarian divisions and mobilizing Sunni support—not to create a sovereign, law- based state but to solidify his grip on power.
A new Attempt to Evade Changing International Perceptions of His Leadership:
Al-Jolani’s recent messaging, in which he seeks to distance himself from radical Islamist groups, is currently being portrayed as the stance of a practical leader with sincere goals to establish a state and its institutions. However, this is far from the first time he has made such assertions. Since declaring his “disconnection” from al- Qaeda, al-Jolani has continuously attempted to position himself as a national figure rather than an ideologue. Yet, this claimed separation has remained largely a slogan. In reality, the organization, which operates under various titles, most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, continues to function with a closed security and military framework that is motivated by ideological loyalty rather than principles of statehood or governance.
Transforming from an armed group to a recognized political authority necessitates a significant epistemological and organizational break from the past. This entails dismantling ideological structures, incorporating the local components into inclusive governance, and conforming to international standards for territorial management. These components are notably absent, replaced instead by hollow rhetoric lacking true meaning. Al-Jolani’s attempt to sever ties with extremist Islamist factions has come too late and lacks credibility—particularly as the organization’s security framework maintains undisclosed connections with various Islamist groups in the region, whether in mobilization or intelligence.
“Domestically, the group’s actions—including political arrests, suppression of media, and violations of human rights—illustrate the continuation of the same oppressive doctrine characteristic of the Jabhat al-Nusra period, now merely concealed beneath a superficial institutional facade.”
Dr. Yahya Alaridi
The international community, including both regional and Western players, has approached the new leader with skepticism, watching to see if he would authentically shift from an armed faction to a legitimate state. However, as further evidence of ongoing violations and subsequent declining local governance emerges, international sentiment has gradually shifted from “considering an opportunity” to acknowledging the failure of this transformation. The targeting of civilians, the restriction of public space, conducting systematic human rights violations, and the crackdown on civil society organizations demonstrate clearly that support for al-Julani is not founded on a holistic political vision, but instead on supporting a terrorist who seeks to build an authoritarian model under a different name.
So, what is the international community waiting for to openly declare the ineffectiveness of a former terrorist leader’s efforts to establish a state?
NB. Dr. Yahya was one of the highest ranking members of the Assad regime to defect in the early days of the revolution. Personally acquainted with Bashar Assad, he witnessed first hand his transformation from a hoped for “reformer” to a brutal dictator responsible for the deaths and displacement of millions of Syrians.
