Security coordination between Syria and Turkey has been accelerating noticeably, as reflected in several operations and incidents over the past months, ranging from the pursuit of cells to coordination on the arrest of wanted individuals. At the same time, NATO has adopted various forms of cooperation with partners outside its membership as part of its approach toward the Southern Neighborhood, including the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Gulf countries.
But could Turkish Syrian security coordination actually develop into a cooperation model that falls within NATO’s approach toward its Southern Neighborhood? And what factors could support or hinder such a trajectory?
From the first day of the fall of the Assad regime, Ankara began intensifying its contacts with the new Syrian leadership in all fields with security and military cooperation being among the most important. Türkiye, which had influence over a number of Syrian armed opposition factions, contributed to directing these factions toward dissolution and integration into the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Ankara also played an important role in supporting the Syrian army’s operations in eastern Syria against the SDF militia.
“From the outset of Syria’s political transition, security and military coordination have defined the new phase of Turkish Syrian relations.”
Eva J. Koulouriotis
On the security front, cooperation between the two countries has continued uninterrupted since the first month after the fall of the Assad regime. This coordination included the files of the PKK and ISIS through the exchange of intelligence and the implementation of joint operations, especially in northern Syria.
Therefore, the signing of an agreement between the two countries similar to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative between NATO and the Arab Gulf States is highly possible. I believe such an agreement will not be long in coming, as it serves the interests of both countries.
First, the two countries share a long border of approximately 911 km which constitutes both a source of cooperation and a source of security risks. Security reports indicate that Turkish territory is still being used by ISIS elements transiting into Syria where the organization continues to maintain a presence in the Syrian desert. At the same time Ankara views the elements of the SDF, especially the non-Syrian ones, as being primarily members of the PKK and their presence in Syrian territory poses a constant threat to Turkish national security. Therefore, cooperation between the two countries on the land border issue will be crucial and necessary for both.
The maritime border is another sensitive issue on which Ankara seeks cooperation with Damascus. Türkiye, which supports the claims of Turkish Cyprus in the island’s exclusive economic waters, wants Damascus to support its vision in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile Damascus sees its exclusive economic zone as an opportunity, hoping to discover oil or gas that will bolster the Syrian economy on its path to recovery.
Second, the counter-terrorism file. As I mentioned previously there are terrorist organizations that still pose a threat to both countries in a joint manner. It is therefore in the mutual interest of both Ankara and Damascus to work together to combat these groups, foremost among them ISIS and the PKK. Ankara’s experience in counterterrorism operations will be an important asset for Damascus in this field.
Third, the file of military cooperation and capacity building. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Damascus began the necessary process of rebuilding its army from scratch. The first step was dissolving the various armed factions and integrating them into a unified military under a single command.
In this regard, Türkiye, which has the second largest army in NATO, has extensive expertise and is well positioned to contribute valuable experience to the Syrian Armed Forces. This could include helping retrain Syrian personnel through joint land and naval exercises, as well as cooperation in the field of drones. Turkish-made weapons are also a primary source of equipment and logistical support for the Syrian Ministry of Defense, with the possibility of cooperation between the two countries in the field of military manufacturing by allowing Ankara to build factories inside Syrian territory. In the same military context, both governments have the conviction that the rise of Israeli influence in the region poses a threat to the stability of both countries. Therefore military cooperation will be a necessity for safeguarding the interests of both states.
“Military cooperation between Türkiye and Syria could become a cornerstone of regional stability, combining defense modernization with shared security interests.”
Eva J. Koulouriotis
In conclusion, Syria today has embarked on the path of military and economic recovery, despite the setbacks and challenges it has faced in recent years. Nevertheless, the road ahead remains long for the new Syrian leadership if Syria is to return to what it was decades ago: a sovereign state with military capabilities that can confront internal challenges such as terrorism as well as external ones such as the Israeli threat.
On the other hand, Türkiye does not want Syria to leave its sphere of influence, viewing the current moment as an opportunity that may not come again. Deepening cooperation between Ankara and Damascus within the framework of security and military agreements would provide Turkey with greater security and strengthen its ability to consolidate its influence in the Middle East.
Viewing all of these considerations from both the Syrian and the Turkish perspectives, it appears that a broad and long-term security and military agreement between the two countries would serve the interests of both Türkiye as well as the new post-Assad Syria.
