Tensions in Syria’s Druze-majority Sweida Province have escalated dramatically in recent days, culminating in Israeli airstrikes on Damascus, a clear message to Syria’s new president, Ahmad al Sharaa. But this crisis didn’t begin on July 11. Rather it is rooted in deeper political and sectarian dynamics that reveal the fragility of Syria’s post-Assad order.
Back in August of 2023, while everyone was accepting Assad’s victory over his people with the support of Iran, its militias, and Russia, the Sweida Governorate rose up declaring its break from Assad’s authority. Since Bashar Assad’s fall last December, Sheikh Hikmat al Hajri, one of the most influential Druze religious leaders, has staunchly opposed the presence of the new Syrian administration in Sweida. He initially framed this as a call for local autonomy, but his demands have since evolved into a broader push for decentralization, rejecting the interim government’s legitimacy and accusing it of being led by “jihadists and takfiris.”
Despite efforts by other Druze leaders to engage with Damascus, al Hajri has consolidated power through the Sweida Military Council, a militia composed of former regime officers, Hezbollah affiliates, drug traffickers, and remnants of the pro-Assad National Defense Forces. His influence is not just religious and military; he also enjoys the backing of Sheikh Muwaffaq al Tarif, spiritual leader of the Druze in Israel, effectively giving him regional cover.
“Al Hajri has emerged as the most powerful Druze figure in Sweida, commanding a controversial militia and securing regional backing from Israel’s top Druze leader, Sheikh al Tarif.”
Eva J. Koulouriotis
It must be emphasized that the new Syrian authorities inherited a country torn apart in every way. Political life was definitely dead in Syria under the rule of the Assads and the Baath Party. It is natural that any new administration would face difficult challenges and make mistakes. However, the new Syrian authorities were initially more preoccupied with foreign affairs; building relations with Sunni countries in the region, the European Union, and the Trump administration in the US.. Consequently, Al Sharaa neglected domestic reconciliation. Symbolic initiatives like a hastily written constitutional declaration and weak attempts at unification failed to build trust among skeptical communities. Missteps, such as the administration’s brutal response to unrest on the Syrian coast, only deepened divisions.
In this complex context, the uprising in Sweida last August became a pivotal moment. Once a supporter of Assad, al-Hajri rebranded himself as a leader of the resistance, launching protests echoing revolutionary slogans. Encouraged by al Tarif, and allegedly backed by Israeli security guarantees, al Hajri challenged the new regime directly. Israel, viewing a stable and demilitarized Druze region as a strategic buffer, had a clear interest in Sweida’s autonomy.
Israel’s strategy is not new. In 2018, it permitted Assad to retake southern Syria on the condition that Iranian militias withdraw from the border, an agreement Russia failed to enforce. Since then, Iranian and Hezbollah forces have entrenched themselves near the Golan Heights, prompting Israel to consider the creation of a secure zone in southern Syria. Sweida’s Druze community, geographically and politically suited for this role, became central to Israeli planning.
Al Sharaa, in power since Assad’s fall, attempted to avoid direct confrontation with Israel. But recent Druze-Bedouin clashes near Sweida provided a pretext for him to assert control over the province. This miscalculation led to swift retaliation by Israel. Strikes on the Syrian General Staff building and near the presidential palace sent an unmistakable message to stay out of Sweida.
In response, Al Sharaa withdrew military forces and tried to mobilize tribal militias instead, a move Israel interpreted as a provocation. Facing further threats, he halted their advance. The negotiations between Damascus and Jerusalem, once progressing through intermediaries like Türkiye and Azerbaijan, have now stalled. Israel demands full Syrian military withdrawal from the south by summer’s end. Al Sharaa is unlikely to reject this outright, but may delay or complicate the process.
Still, the implications are grave. If Damascus retaliates by unleashing jihadist groups in the south, Israel could face renewed threats from ISIS or Hezbollah.
“The collapse of Al Sharaa’s authority would invite chaos, reigniting civil war and undermining regional stability.”
Eva J. Koulouriotis
On the other hand, Al Sharaa’s fears now center on a potential Israeli ground operation “David’s Corridor” linking the Golan Heights to Sweida and further east.
The Sweida crisis remains unresolved. While attention focuses on the south, other flashpoints in Syria’s west and east simmer. The next steps from Damascus, Jerusalem, and Washington DC will determine whether Syria descends into deeper fragmentation or edges toward fragile stabilization.
