For more than a decade, Türkiye opened its doors to 3.6 million Syrians fleeing war. This act of refuge was called “ansar“, protectors, reflecting a deep cultural and religious morality. But in 2026, the atmosphere in the streets, in parliament, and on social media tells a different story: one where hospitality turns into hostility, and rumors spread faster than facts.
Violence against Syrians is not hypothetical, but it erupts in predictable patterns. In Kayseri, June 2024 and following allegations (later proven false) that a Syrian man had abused a child, mobs overturned cars and set fire to Syrian-owned shops. In Altındağ, Ankara, 2021, homes and businesses were looted after a Turkish teenager was killed in a clash with Syrians. In Gaziantep, Antalya, and Şanlıurfa groups armed with knives and clubs are targeting Syrians over rent disputes or petty crimes.
“Violence against Syrians is no longer an isolated incident, it is a recurring pattern fueled by fear, misinformation, and collective blame.”
Mahmoud Bitar
Civil society groups now report “at least one attack on a Syrian, sometimes more” every day and February 6, 2023, earthquakes brought a new dimension as videos emerged of Syrians being beaten on charges of looting with the labels “looting” and “Syrian” becoming interchangeable online.
Three Factors Triggering the Reaction the Economy as a Scapegoat and Syrians are blamed for rising rents, low wages, and market inflation, while official Istanbul data shows a lower crime rate among Syrians (153 per 100,000 compared to 210 per 100,000 for Turkish citizens), this perception persists. However, statistics rarely overcome the feeling of exclusion from your own neighborhood. Metin Çorabatır from the Centre for Refugee and Migration Studies attributes much of the prejudice to misinformation on social media and Civil society organizations add that the media portrays Syrians as “triggering racist attacks and behaviors.” as YouTube channels conducting street interviews and viral videos act as accelerators, turning individual offenses into collective accusations.
The Turkish government’s message that Syria are “safe for return” has altered public expectations. The 2016 EU-Türkiye agreement, which paid Türkiye to host refugees, has made Syrians seem like a transaction for many Turks. Erdoğan condemned the Kayseri riots and accused opposition parties of “inciting xenophobia,” demonstrating how deeply ingrained migration has become in domestic political struggles.
For Syrians, the result is what Çorabatır describes as exposure to “racist rhetoric and actions” as a daily condition. A 2021 study conducted in Gaziantep revealed that racism is the biggest concern for Syrians, even surpassing economic problems meanwhile teachers report that Syrian children suffer from a “psychology of exclusion” and that school violence is increasing.
Social media from late 2025 to 2026 shows that the situation has not calmed down. In a video published in Adana in December 2025, a Syrian father is allegedly attacked in front of his child, and in a clip published in Şanlıurfa in January 2026, a photo of a Syrian man covered in blood is accompanied by the caption, “They beat the Syrian man and handed him over to the gendarmerie,” noticing comments section under these posts constantly calls for deportation and celebrates violence.
Türkiye is not unique; economic stress and mass migration test every society, however, the transition from “temporary guests” to “permanent scapegoats” has consequences. As in Kayseri, the rule of law erodes when crowds replace courts, social cohesion weakens when children grow up to be targets, and for a country that once lectured Europe on refugee ethics to condone street-level pogroms undermines Türkiye’s own diplomatic standing.
“When crowds replace courts, the rule of law weakens, social cohesion fractures, and entire communities become vulnerable to collective blame.”
Mahmoud Bitar
The solution isn’t slogans of brotherhood but it’s tedious, structural work with transparent aid data to dispel the myth of “they’re taking our money”; accountability for hate crimes instead of collective punishment; and media standards that separate the nationality of the suspect from the crime.
Hospitality was a choice Türkiye made in 2011, what it chooses in 2026, managing tension or fanning it, will determine the country’s next decade more than any other choice. Attacks on Syrians aren’t just about Syrians, but they’re a stress test for Turkish institutions and right now, those institutions are failing that test.
