Thomas Barrack and the Fracture of Vision

When we addressed successive UN envoys to Syria, from Staffan de Mistura to Geir Pedersen, we understood that the road between what an envoy sees on the ground, and what ultimately reaches the international decisionmaker, is neither open nor straight. However extensive an envoy’s access, maps, and reports may be, he remains, in the end, an official of an organization whose capacity to act depends on the will of the states that carry the greatest weight within it, foremost among them the United States.

Thomas Barrack, however, is not speaking as a detached intermediary. He is adopting the narrative of the authorities in Damascus and turning it into what amounts to an official American position, perhaps in the hope that this will help build a new legitimacy for them.

Barrack saw only one incident in Suwayda, an incident that serves the narrative the Damascus authorities want to establish. He saw what happened to one “person,” but he did not see Suwayda.

He did not see the siege imposed by the authorities on an entire population for more than a week. He did not see the shelling that struck civilians, the dozens of villages that were burned and looted, or those who were forced to flee. He did not acknowledge more than two thousand people killed, nor the abuses that continue day after day.

He saw one incident and placed it at the forefront of the picture, while the larger scene was pushed outside the frame. At that point, the issue is no longer merely one of media selectivity. It becomes political selectivity in the very definition of truth.

Barrack was not speaking from the position of a neutral observer. In practice, he is transmitting the narrative of the Damascus authorities and giving their distorted and selective account American political weight, transforming it from the narrative of one party to the conflict into something resembling the authoritative version of reality.

“The most dangerous point is that the authorities in Damascus should become the lens through which Washington sees the Syrian scene, and Suwayda in particular.”

Dr. Yahya Alaridi

That is the most dangerous point: that the authorities in Damascus should become the lens through which Washington sees the Syrian scene, and Suwayda in particular.

When the crimes surrounding that reality are concealed, diplomacy ceases to be a tool for understanding what is happening. It becomes a mechanism for reproducing the narrative of a party that once attempted to annihilate its opponents and failed, and that continues along the same path of violations, shelling civilians and besieging them.

The focus on Suwayda today is no coincidence. Suwayda has become the real test of a ruling authority whose crimes expose not only its attitude toward Suwayda; they reveal, through its conduct there, the nature of its project toward Syrians as a whole.

That is why the authorities are trying to reverse the equation: to portray Suwayda as an obstacle to stability, and those defending their land and dignity as though they were the problem. Meanwhile, concealed behind this narrative is the responsibility of an authority backed by money and influence and supported by dozens of armed terrorist formations that are spreading killing, looting, and chaos across Syria.

The “gangs” Barrack refers to in his account are those who defended their land and their families against a brutal invasion. Yet he overlooks the thousands of foreign fighters and the armed formations affiliated with the al-Jolani authorities that are deployed across the country and engage in killing, looting, and terror.

He presents Suwayda as an obstacle to building state institutions, while ignoring a far more glaring reality: a single armed extremist can obstruct a decision issued by a ministry belonging to the authorities, while scenes of extremism and criminality are no longer isolated incidents but part of a broader Syrian reality.

So how can Suwayda be the problem while the armed structure that is supposedly part of the state, or operates under its umbrella, is simply ignored?

Suwayda and the Question of State Authority:

The authorities possess the force. They possess the institutions. They claim to be the state. Therefore, they must provide evidence that they came to protect, not subjugate; to build a state, not reproduce the logic of domination.

Instead, they continue a policy of repression and criminality, shelling civilians, besieging them, and inciting against them.

The question therefore becomes clearer: Is Suwayda expected to place its trust in an authority that has offered no evidence that it is either able, or willing, to protect those who are supposedly its own citizens?

Syrian Unity: Control Is Not Sovereignty:

If Washington is serious about its repeated commitment to Syrian unity, it must understand that unity cannot be measured by the ability of an armed authority to impose its will on the country’s periphery.

“A map is not a state. Control is not sovereignty. Subjugation is not national unity.”

Dr. Yahya Alaridi

A map is not a state. Control is not sovereignty. Subjugation is not national unity.

A state that needs force to keep its constituent communities within it has not solved the problem of division. It has merely postponed the explosion.

Unity built on fear is not unity. It is a ceasefire waiting to break.

Barrack has spoken of the death of the Sykes–Picot order. Yet the irony is that attempting to reimpose Damascus-centered rule by force may, in practice, reproduce the very logic of that era: borders and maps unified from the outside, while societies remain unreconciled within.

If Sykes–Picot has truly died, the lesson is not to return to an even more rigid centralism. It is to recognize that the future of the region will not be shaped by borders alone, but by legitimacy, security, and the ability to protect the communities that make up the state.

Suwayda is not a local detail that can be reduced to a single incident, a single person, or a political statement.

Its geographic, historical, political, and spiritual position at the heart of the Syrian Lebanese Jordanian triangle, and its direct proximity to Israel, make its security part of a broader regional security equation.

Anyone who genuinely seeks peace in the Levant cannot build it by ignoring the south or attempting to break the will of its people.

Peace built upon Suwayda’s fear will not be peace. It will be a truce awaiting the next round of hostility.

That is why the real question that should be put to Thomas Barrack is not: Why did you see one particular person?

It is: Why did you see him, but fail to see Suwayda?

Why did he appear so prominently in your account while thousands of besieged civilians disappeared from view?

Why did one incident appear while repeated violations vanished?

And why did the authorities’ narrative become so clearly visible, while the suffering of civilians remained outside the frame?

When this happens, the diplomat, knowingly or unknowingly, becomes more than a transmitter of a narrative. He becomes part of its production and entrenchment.

That is precisely what Washington should guard against.

The most dangerous thing a great power can do is not simply to mischaracterize an incident. It is to adopt the narrative of one party to a conflict and then use its political and international weight to elevate that narrative into truth.

If the American message to Damascus is that Syria must remain united, then let the message be clear:

Unity is the ideal, but not at the expense of those who insist on their dignity; not through siege, not through shelling, not by ignoring violations, and not by turning victims into a footnote in the authorities’ narrative.

“The unity of Syria cannot be a project for subjugating Syrians. A state cannot be built by forcing its constituent communities to submit.”

Dr. Yahya Alaridi

The unity of Syria cannot be a project for subjugating Syrians. A state cannot be built by forcing its constituent communities to submit. It is built by convincing them that the state has come to protect them, not to kill them.